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Abstract 
Recent imaging studies have found activation in areas associated with motion processing 
and motor planning during a range of cognitive tasks involving tools.  This has led some 
researchers to conclude that motor information is central to the conceptual representation 
of tools. To explore this hypothesis, we used a two-alternative forced-choice task to 
examine whether children and adults use motor information to determine the extension of 
new tool categories. Adults, 5-year-olds and 3-year-olds were introduced to a novel tool 
(“a dax”) and shown its function and how to manipulate it. Then two unlabelled tools 
were presented, one with the same function and one with the same motor manipulation. 
All three groups systematically extended the novel label to the tool with the same 
function rather than the one with same motor manipulation. Both 3- and 5-year-old 
children continued to extend by function when the function was imaginary and not 
perceptually accessible. We conclude that function is central to conceptual content of tool 
terms while motor information is not. Function Versus Motor 
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Introduction 
What is a hammer?  For over 30 years developmental and cognitive psychologists 
have debated whether artifacts are defined by their visual appearance, purpose, or origins.   
Recent work in cognitive neuroscience suggests a different answer —hammers and other 
tools could be defined by the characteristic movements used to employ them.   
This hypothesis gains support from several lines of research implicating the same 
brain regions in the representation of motor movements and the conceptualization of 
tools. First, imaging studies have identified a network of regions that are active during the 
identification and naming of tools (relative to animals, faces or buildings).  This network 
includes the left medial fusiform gyrus (left-MFG), the posterior middle temporal gyrus 
(PMTG), left intraparietal sulcus (left-IPS), and left ventral premotor cortex (left-VPMC) 
(see Martin, 2007 for review).  This network is also active in nonpictoral tasks involving 
tool concepts, such as single-word reading, lexical decision, and word generation, 
suggesting that these regions are involved in representing the meaning of tool terms 
(Chao, Haxby & Martin, 1999; Kiefer, 2005; Vitali, Abutalebi, Tettamanti, Rowe, Scifo, 
Fazio et al., 2005). These regions are also implicated in processing movement. Left-MFG 
and PMTG are active in tasks involving artifact motion, while left-IPS and left-VPMC 
are active in tasks that involve motor representations such as planning, executing or 
imagining actions or tool usage (Boronat, Buxbaum, Coslett, Tang, Saffran, Kimberg & 
Detre, 2005; Decety, 1996; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Mahon, Milleville, Negri, Rumiati, 
Caramazza & Martin, 2007; Martin, 2007).  During tool tasks activation in left-IPS and 
left-VPMC is affected by a participant’s motoric experience with a particular tool type Function Versus Motor 
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(Weisberg, von Turennout & Martin, 2007), suggesting that these activations may reflect 
the retrieval of motor programs associated with tool use. 
Findings such as these have generated a broad range of hypotheses about the role 
of motor information in conceptual processing (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey & Wilson, 
2003; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Here we focus on one question 
raised by these data: to what extent is the conceptual content of tool terms motoric? There 
are at least three possible answers.  
According to the strong embodied cognition view, motor cortex is activated 
during conceptual tasks because motor programs are central to the conceptual 
representation of some classes of words such as tool terms or verbs (e.g., Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In its clearest 
and most precise form, this amount to the hypothesis that the meaning of these terms 
consist of simulations of the actions associated with them. In the case of action verbs this 
view is made explicit by Glenberg and Kaschak who argue that “understanding an 
[action] sentence calls upon the same cognitive mechanisms as those used in planning 
and taking action” (p.561) and that “all of the components of knowledge [about actions] 
are action-based… The meaning of a situation to an individual is the set of actions 
available to that individual in that situation.” (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2005, p. 15-16). 
Similarly, Gallese and Lakoff (2005) argue that understanding an action requires a mental 
simulation of the motor representations that are used in action and perception (p. 457).  In 
other words, each verb is associated with a distinct pattern of movements, and this pattern 
is activated every time the concept is instantiated in thought.  This hypothesis could be 
readily extended to the domain of tools.  Many researchers define tools as manipulable Function Versus Motor 
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objects that have “direct relationships between their physical structure and the motor 
movements associated with their use” (e.g., Mahon et al., 2007). Thus, on the strong 
embodied hypothesis, we might argue that the meaning of a tool term is constituted by a 
simulation of the motor movements involved in using that tool.  On this proposal 
recognizing a hammer or understanding the word hammer would require simulating the 
motor programs associated with the act of hammering, resulting in premotor and parietal 
activation.  
Another view (a.k.a. the weak embodied view) is that motor programs only 
partially determine conceptual content – knowledge of an object is distributed among 
several relevant representational systems: sensory systems representing visual form, 
motor systems representing information about manipulation and perhaps abstract 
conceptual systems representing properties such as function or kind. For example, Martin 
(2007) suggests that “object concepts… emerge from weighted activity within property-
based brain regions”. This hypothesis raises the possibility that the relative contribution 
of different systems could change with experience.  For example, early concepts may 
begin as primarily motoric with more abstract properties growing in importance during 
development. Alternately, the role of motor information in conceptual representations 
might depend upon expertise in tool use, becoming increasing important as children gain 
experience with the movements associated with particular tools..  
A third possibility is that motor information does not constitute conceptual 
content either partially or wholly (a.k.a. the abstract cognition view). Instead, tool 
concepts have abstract meanings based on their current function (e.g., Kemler Nelson, 
Russell & Duke, 2000a; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blaire, 2000b) or their Function Versus Motor 
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creator’s intentions (e.g., Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003).While this position has 
gained some acceptance in developmental psychology, the challenge for this position is 
to explain how and why brain regions involved in motion processing and motor 
representations become active in conceptual tasks.  We will return to this issue in the 
discussion. 
What is conceptual content?  
These three theories differ in the role that motor information plays in determining 
the conceptual content of tool terms. Thus to distinguish between them we need a method 
of assessing what information determines the meaning of a concept. Patterns of neural 
activation alone cannot resolve this issue.  Knowing that regions implicated in motor and 
motion processing are active in a conceptual task does, by itself, tell us the role that these 
regions play in conceptual processing.  Do these regions represent the meaning of the 
concept or are these activations a downstream effect of retrieving that meaning?  
One approach to understanding the content of concepts is to examine how they 
are extended.  Theories of concepts vary in their explanatory scope and their construal of 
conceptual content.  But theories which posit that concepts have content (contra Fodor, 
1998) typically claim that this content is used to determine the extension of a concept, 
and thus guides categorization (Laurence & Margolis, 1999).  For example, on the 
classical or definitional theory of concepts, the content of a concept consists of a set of 
features and these features are necessary and sufficient for category membership.  In 
contrast, in the theory-theory of concepts, the content of a concept depends on its relation 
to other concepts.  But again these relations determine what can be considered a category 
member and what cannot. Function Versus Motor 
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Because word meanings are generally assumed to be concepts, there is a long 
tradition (in both philosophy and psychology) of studying conceptual content by 
examining how people extend words to new exemplars.  By systematically varying these 
exemplars we can test alternate hypotheses about the content of a concept. For example, I 
might believe that a kitten is a small cat, and you might believe that it is a young, 
immature cat. By presenting people with cats of different ages and sizes and asking 
which are kittens, we could easily determine who is right and thus come closer to 
understanding the conceptual content of the term. A task of this kind is well-suited to the 
question we raised above. If the conceptual content of tool terms consists of 
representations of the actions typically used to employ them, then these actions should 
guide word extension.  Hammers should be those things which are swung with a 
characteristic extension of the forearm. If this is not the criterion for extending tool terms, 
then we will need to look for other explanations for the patterns of activation observed in 
tool tasks.  
It is critical to note that the conceptual content does not exhaust conceptual 
knowledge.  We clearly know more about categories than the criteria that determine their 
extension.  Thus in the example above, if we confirm that people systematically reserve 
the word “kitten” for immature cats regardless of physical stature, we would conclude 
that immaturity, but not size, is part of the conceptual content of the term. But we would 
still have to account for the fact that people know that kittens are typically small and are 
likely to use that information when trying to spot kittens in the world.  Thus the notion of 
conceptual content is distinct, at least in principle, from the notion of semantic memory 
or conceptual knowledge.  Nevertheless conceptual content plays privileged role in Function Versus Motor 
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theories of concepts (Laurence & Margolis, 1999).  Content individuates concepts:  two 
concepts are different concepts if and only if they have distinct content (otherwise they 
are two tokens of the same concept).  In containment theories (like most semantic feature 
theories) the content of a concept is invoked by each use of that concept.  Even in 
theories which eschew the notion that concepts contain other concepts, such as theory-
theory, the properties which determine categorization and individuate concepts also have 
a privileged role in guiding inference.
1 
Why study the development of tool terms? 
In these studies we compare the extension of tool terms in adults and young 
children.  There are three reasons for taking a developmental approach.  First, in 
comparison to college students, preschoolers are less educated, less metacognitively 
savvy, less strategic and less metalinguistically advanced (for reviews see Flavell, Miller 
& Miller, 2002; Gombert, 1992).  Perhaps, even as adults, our work-a-day concepts are 
rather simple in nature, but our exposure to scientific theories has made us aware of their 
inadequacies, leading us to supplement them with concepts that have more theoretically 
rich content (Fodor, 1998).  This richer conceptual content might shape adult 
performance in a deliberate extension task, but its unlikely to be available to the young 
child.  
Second, most developmental theories posit a shift from concrete sensory or motor 
concepts in infancy to more abstract concepts in adulthood (see Mandler, 2004 for 
discussion).  In Piagetian theory this shift involves a conceptual change which allows the 
                                                 
1 In theory-theories the critical properties are typically called conceptual structure rather than conceptual 
content both to avoid the metaphor of containment and because the properties that individuate concepts are 
their relations to other concepts and thus they derive from the structures in which concepts are embedded. 
We will continue to use the phrase conceptual content for simplicity’s sake with no intention of restricting 
ourselves to containment theories rather than inferential ones (see Laurence & Margolis, 1999). Function Versus Motor 
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child to supplement sensory motor schemas with abstract and increasingly complex 
symbols.  In contrast, theories of embodied cognition argue that concepts remain concrete 
into adulthood.  Nevertheless, such proposals often involve a developmental shift toward 
abstraction.  Some theorists suggest that concepts which are fundamentally sensory motor 
nature may gain more abstract symbolic properties through their association with external 
linguistic symbols (Smith & Gasser, 2005).  Others argue that sensory or motoric detail 
can be bleached out as concepts are metaphorically extended.  For example, Glenberg 
and colleagues make this argument in reference to verbs of transfer (Glenberg, Sato, 
Cattaneo, Riggio, Palumbo & Buccino, 2008, pp. 907-8): 
In this context [the one in which give is said to an infant] the meaning of transfer is 
encoded as an action having as parameters a type of grasp (e.g., power grip), force related 
to the object being transferred, and a direction of movement specified by the location of 
the object (e.g., the self) and location of the recipient (e.g., the mother). Repetition of 
actions of this sort leads to development of an action schema in anterior portions of 
premotor cortex…which becomes the meaning of the verb “to give”. . . . The basic action 
schema can be associated with other verbs of transfer by generalizing the grasp and force 
(i.e., the means of transfer) parameters.  Thus, “Marco hands/throws/sends the papers” 
can all be understood using the same schema with a change in the specification of the 
means of transfer. The action schema is generalized for abstract transfer by using 
communication as the means of transfer. 
 
Thus the content of early transfer verbs like give is argued to be motoric, some process of 
abstraction occurs which allow the child to pull out a notion of transfer from these 
motoric representations, and this more abstract notion of transfer then becomes part of the 
meaning of late acquired verbs of transfer such as delegate or lease which have no 
motoric content of their own.   A parallel account might be envisioned for tools: 
children’s initial concept of hammer might consist (entirely or in part) of the motor 
movements used to employ that tool, but by some process of generalization across many 
uses of many tools, she might abstract away from the specific motoric properties of this Function Versus Motor 
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action to derive a more general notion of the tool’s function.
2 By examining tool 
extension in three-year-olds, five-year-olds and adults we might catch of glimpse of 
abstraction in process. 
Third, recent results from cognitive neuroscience suggest a very different 
prediction about the developmental trajectory of tool concepts: Motoric representations 
may actually become more important with age.   Activation of motor regions during tool 
identification is affected by participants prior experience with tools (Kan, Kable, Van 
Scoyoc, Chatterjee & Thompson-Schill, 2006; Weisberg et al., 2007).  For example, 
Weisberg and colleagues introduced participants to novel tools and tested them in a 
visual matching task. Initially activation in left-VPMC and left-IPS was no greater for the 
tools than for scrambled images.  But after participants were given experience using some 
of the tools, activations emerged in both areas which were greater for those tools that the 
participants had manipulated.  As we noted earlier. these same areas have been found to 
be active during tasks which involve the conceptual processing of tool terms (Chao et al., 
1999; Kiefer, 2005; Vitali et al., 2005).  If we believe that these activations reflect the 
conceptual content of tool terms, then Weisberg’s results would suggest that tool 
concepts only come to have motoric content through tool use.  While tool use is 
ubiquitous in humans, young children clearly have less experience with tools than adults.  
Preschoolers are often forbidden from touching many of the tools they encounter (knives, 
                                                 
2 The alert reader might be dissatisfied with this story.  It is unclear, in both cases, where the more abstract 
representations is coming from.  If the child’s initial representation is truly and solely motoric and she 
generalizes it by removing specific motoric content, then she should be left with nothing or with a very 
vague motoric representation.  It is certainly not clear how the concept of “transfer” or concepts of specific 
functions could arise from this process.  One gets the sense in the passage above that the notion of transfer 
is lurking there from the beginning in all its abstract glory. How can the “recipient” or the “object being 
transferred” be identified without such a concept? Thus the authors may be supposing that motoric 
representations include these abstract parameters as well.  If not , Fodor’s arguments against creation of 
new conceptual primitives would apply (1981; 1998).. Function Versus Motor 
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saws, mommy’s laptop).  They are also isolated from most activities of production and 
thus are presumably exposed to fewer tool types than adults.  Children’s ability to 
manipulate tools develops gradually. In many cases, the motor movements that 
preschoolers employ are different from those used by adults (Rosenbloom & Horton, 
1971) and more variable (Braswell, Rosengren & Pierroutsakos, 2007). For example, 
although spoons are one of the earliest tools that children master, toddlers typically grasp 
them using a variety of hand positions, none of which allow them to tilt the spoon 
independent of their hand as adults do (Connolly and Dalgleish, 1989).  These findings 
raise the possibility that young children’s motoric tool knowledge may not be stable 
enough or complete enough to provide the conceptual content for tool terms. 
The word extension task as a measure of conceptual content  
To explore tool concepts across development, we need a task that taps conceptual 
content and can be performed by young children. The present study employs the word-
extension task, a paradigm which assess the conceptual content that children assign to 
novel words (Gentner, 1978; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Landau, Smith & Jones, 
1988; Soja, Carey & Spelke, 1991). 
When we examine the extension of previously acquired  words it can be difficult 
to determine which features are guiding extension and hence what the content of the 
concept is.  Real words typically label categories which overlap on multiple dimensions.  
For example, hammers have similar functions and similar shapes, were created by similar 
processes, and are used with a similar motor movement.  Furthermore, since individuals 
have had extensive experience with real tool categories, it is impossible to know how 
they arrived at this particular content (was it their initial hypothesis about this concept or Function Versus Motor 
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were they forced to it by experience?). The word extension task allows us to avoid these 
complications by introducing participants to a novel word (and concept) and examining 
how they extend it. In such studies children are shown a novel object (the standard) that 
is labeled with a novel word (dax). Then they are shown two or more novel objects which 
are not labeled (the test objects). Typically each test object shares one feature with the 
standard.  The child is then asked (directly or indirectly) which one of the objects is 
“another dax”.  
This task is accessible even to toddlers. Children as young as two will 
systematically extend a novel word to objects with the same shape, as opposed to objects 
with the same texture or color (e.g., Landau et al., 1988)..  In contrast, when children are 
asked which object is most similar to the standard, their judgments are less systematic 
and sensitive to a variety of object properties.  This suggests that word extension reflects 
children’s knowledge about the concepts encoded by object labels rather than the raw 
perceptual similarity of the objects being categorized. 
In fact, results from other paradigms suggest that even infants 9-14 months have 
systematic expectations about the extension of novel words (Waxman & Markow, 1995; 
Dewar & Xu, 2007; Dewar & Xu, 2009).  For example, by 9 months of age infants who 
hear two different labels (Look a dax! Look a toma!) are able to infer that two objects 
with distinct shapes are present (Dewar & Xu, 2007).  They look away more quickly 
when two objects with different shapes are revealed, but examine the display longer when 
two identical objects are revealed, or two objects with the same shape but different 
colors.   This bias to extend words by shape might reflect a deeper preference to interpret 
words as labels for more abstract kinds.  By 10 months of age, infants expect that objects Function Versus Motor 
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which have different labels will have different internal properties even though their 
shapes were similar (Dewar & Xu, 2009).  
Previous word extension studies have focused on children’s use of perceptual and 
abstract features in the categorization of artifacts and animals.  No studies have explored 
the role of motor information in children’s tool concepts.  The research to date 
demonstrates that toddlers can extend artifact labels by shape and by function.  The 
relation between shape and function is more controversial.  Some studies find that shape 
initially dominates, with extension by function increasing across development (Gentner, 
1978; Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996). However, when researchers use functions which 
motivate the external properties of the object, children as young as two privilege function 
over shape (Kemler Nelson et al., 2000a). This has lead some theorists to posit that 
children use shape primarily as a clue to what an object’s current or intended function 
might be (Diesendruck et al., 2003; Kemler Nelson et al., 2000ab).   
Motion and Function in Children’s Tool Knowledge 
Two recent studies provide tentative evidence that motor information may play a 
critical role in young children’s conceptualization of tools. The first explored tool-
directed actions in one-year-olds (Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007).  Children were 
given experience using a novel tool to perform a particular task (inserting it into a tube to 
pull out pom-poms).  One group was taught to hold the tool by its long skinny handle, a 
second learned to hold it by a wide loop at the end, and third practiced holding it both 
ways.  Children were then given two new tasks.  One task had a similar function (the tool 
was inserted into a hole to turn on the light) but could only be performed by holding the 
tool by the loop. The other task had a different function (using the loop to grab a handle) Function Versus Motor 
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and could only be performed by holding the tool by the handle.  The authors found that 
children perseverated in holding the tool as they had been taught to, even when it was 
employed for a different function.  Thus the authors conclude that “rather than learning 
about tool function (e.g., hammering), infants learn about which part of the tool is meant 
to be held, at least early in their exposure to a novel tool.” (p. 352).  
If we assume that this advantage not only influences tool use but also tool 
concepts, these results suggest that infants might initially categorize tools according to 
their manipulative features rather then their functions.  However, there are good reasons 
to be wary of this conclusion.  In this study, function and grasp were manipulated in very 
different ways.  Children were trained on distinct grasp patterns and then presented with a 
tool which would allow them to use whichever grasp they had acquired (though only one 
grasp would solve the problem).  In contrast, function was manipulated by creating two 
separate tasks:  children were not allowed to choose which function to perform on each 
trial (the object acted upon did not afford both), nor were they allowed to choose which 
tool to perform the function with.  The strongest claim that can be made on the basis of 
these data is that the child’s knowledge of the grasp is not bound tightly to a function of 
the tool that emerges when the same tool is put to new uses. 
The second study examines knowledge of tool movements in school-aged 
children (Mounoud, Duscherer, Moy & Perraudin, 2007).  Mounoud and colleagues 
found that children between 5 and 12 can identify some pantomimes of tool use.  
Furthermore viewing these pantomimes facilitates subsequent identification or 
categorization of a picture of the tool involved in the enactment.  The authors note that 
these results are compatible with a range of hypotheses. Among them is the possibility Function Versus Motor 
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that viewing the pantomimes activates the motor programs used for executing the same 
action and that these motor programs are part of the conceptual representation of the tool.  
However they also acknowledge the possibility that the facilitation effect reflects: 1) 
direct connections between motoric and visual representations of the tool; 2) priming of 
verbs that describe the pantomime and are associated with the tool; 3) activation of 
abstract conceptual  knowledge about the depicted action including its function and the 
objects typically associated with it.  In fact, Mounoud and collaborators argue for the 
centrality of action representation in young children’s tool concepts by invoking the 
importance of goals and then functions in children’s conceptualization.  
From a developmental point of view, action goals are the basis on which children 
apprehend the various functional properties of objects; action goals explain how children 
attribute meaning to objects and actions. Once this first step in concept formation is 
achieved, children will be able to select functionally equivalent elements, thus grounding 
taxonomic categories. 
 
The use of the word action to describe both motoric manipulations and the functions that 
they serve is common in discussions of embodied cognition.  However, as Mounoud and 
colleagues note, neuropsychological evidence suggests that our knowledge of object 
function and our knowledge of object manipulation are distinct.  Apraxic patients (with 
lesions in the left IPS, IPL and dorsal premotor cortex) are impaired in their knowledge 
of object manipulation but retain their knowledge of object functions, while patients with 
lesions in the anterior inferotemporal areas often have impaired knowledge of tool 
functions but retain the ability to manipulate tools (e.g., Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; 
Buxbaum, Veramonti, & Schwartz, 2000; Sirigu, Duhamel & Poncet, 1991).  The studies 
that follow explore which of these two distinct kinds of information constrains the 
extension of novel tool terms. Function Versus Motor 
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Present Studies 
To investigate the content of tool concepts, we conducted a series of word extension 
experiments with adults, 5-year-olds and 3-year-olds. If motor information determines 
conceptual content then the novel label should be extended to objects that share the same 
motor manipulation. Such a finding would support the strong embodied view of conceptual 
content. Alternatively, if abstract information like the tool’s function determines conceptual 
content, then the novel label should be extended to objects that share the same function. 
Comparing adults’ responses with children’s will allow us to see whether there is a 
developmental shift in the content of tool concepts. 
Experiment 1 
Participants 
 Sixteen adults (7 men, M=22;5, range 19;3-31;5) and 24 five-year-olds (12 boys, 
M=5;0, range 4;5-5;6) participated in the study. All were native English speakers. 
Stimuli 
Two sets of practice items and five sets of critical items were developed.  Each set 
consisted of three novel tools. For practice items, there was a standard tool with a 
particular motor manipulation and function (i.e., it had to be squeezed to force playdough 
out) and two test items. One of the test tools shared both the motor manipulation and the 
function of the target tool while the other shared neither. Practice tools were used to teach 
participants the task without biasing them to respond to either the motor manipulation or 
the function of the standard tool. We expected participants to always select the tool that 
shared both features with the target; participants who did not do so were corrected and 
given a second chance. Function Versus Motor 
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For the critical items, each set of novel tools consisted of a standard tool with a 
particular motor manipulation M1 (i.e., the tool had to be swung up and down) and a 
particular function F1 (i.e., to make holes in playdough) and two test tools. One test tool 
shared the motor manipulation M1 (i.e., it had to be swung up and down) but had a 
different function F2 (i.e., to make a noise).  The other test tool shared the standard tool’s 
function F1 (i.e., making holes in playdough) but had a different motor manipulation M2 
(i.e., it had to be rolled by extending and retracting the arm).  
All tools within a set had a similar shape and color. To ensure that our findings 
were not colored by preferences for particular objects, motor manipulations or functions, 
we counterbalanced across participants which of the test tools was the function match and 
which was the motor match. This was done by designing each standard tool so that it had 
two different functions and motor manipulations. For example, the standard tool from the 
above example could also be rolled (M2) to make noise (F2). The first test tool in the set 
in this case shared the function F2 (to make a noise) but not the motor manipulation M1 (it 
had to be swung) and the second test tool shared the motor manipulation M2 (it had to be 
rolled) but not the function F1 (to make holes in playdough). See Figure 1 for an example.  
___________________________________ 
Figure 1 
___________________________________ 
Table 1 lists the functions and motor manipulations for each test trial. The order 
of presentation of the two test tools was counterbalanced within and across participants.  
Thus each participant saw the function match before the motor match on half of the trials 
and the motor match before the function match for the other half.  Similarly for each test Function Versus Motor 
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set, half of the participants saw the function match first and half saw the motor match 
first.  
___________________________________ 
Table 1 
___________________________________ 
Procedure 
The procedures for practice trials and critical trials were identical. First, the 
experimenter showed the standard tool to the participant, labeling it with a novel word 
(i.e., “This is a quep”).  Then she demonstrated how to use it and what it is for, naming 
both the motor manipulation and the function (i.e., “You roll it to make holes in 
playdough”). Then the experimenter demonstrated and labeled the manipulation and 
function of each test tool. After this, both test tools were put in front of the participant. 
Then the experimenter asked: “Which one is another quep?” After the participant pointed 
to one of the tools, the experimenter moved on to the next trial.  All participants 
succeeded in choosing the correct tools on the practice trials and proceeded to the critical 
trials.   
Results 
For each participant we calculated the proportion of function choices (Figure 2). 
This score could range from +1 (all function matches) to 0 (all motor matches), with .5 
indicating chance performance. These scores were submitted to one-sample t-tests to 
determine whether they deviated from chance. Adults showed a reliable preference for 
the test item with the same function, selecting it 93% of the time (t(15)=17, p<0.001). 
Five-year-olds shared this preference for the tool with the same function, selecting it 75% Function Versus Motor 
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of the time (t(23)=5.93, p<0.01)
 3. A direct comparison of the two groups confirmed that 
adults were more likely to categorize tools based on shared function (t(35)=3.57, 
p<0.005). All 16 adults and 21 of the 24 children selected more function than motor 
matches ( 
2(1)=16, p<.001;  
2(1)=13.5, p<.001, respectively).  
___________________________________ 
Figure 2 
___________________________________ 
Discussion 
Both five-year-old children and adults are more likely to categorize novel tools 
based on shared function rather than shared motor movement. These data suggest that 
abstract conceptual information plays a greater role in the extension of tool concepts than 
associated motor representations. However, five-year-olds were less likely than adults to 
choose tools based on function. There are two possible explanations for this difference. 
One is that children’s concepts are as abstract as adults’ but limitations in their attention, 
memory, or understanding of the task impede their performance.  
The second possibility is that five-year-olds are in transition from a more concrete 
conceptual system to a more abstract one. To begin exploring this developmental 
trajectory, we examined the extension of tool concepts in three-year-olds. Three-year-
olds are of interest for several reasons.  First, in many word learning tasks they show a 
greater reliance on concrete perceptual features than older children (e.g., Smith et al., 
                                                 
3 This finding was replicated in an additional experiment which explored whether preference for function 
persisted over a delay.  Children were given an irrelevant task (to color a drawing) after the presentation of 
the test tools and before they were asked the test question. Sixteen 5-year-olds participated (11 boys, 
mean=4;10; range: 4;6-5;5). The children extended the novel tool terms to items with the same function on 
70% of trials (t(15)=4.14, p<0.01).  
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1996). Second, they have limited experience using tools and know fewer tool terms than 
older children and adults.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 consisted of three conditions.  One condition (Exp 2c) paralleled 
our first experiment by examining 3-year-olds’ categorization when motor movement and 
function were pitted against each other.  The other two conditions provided a baseline by 
examining children’s categorization when only one dimension was available.  Exp 2a 
explored whether children would categorize tools on the basis of shared motor 
information in the absence of function information. Exp. 2b examined the effect of shared 
function in the absence of motor information.  Strong performance in both conditions 
would validate our method, demonstrating that children are able to encode both features 
in this task.   
Participants, Stimuli and Procedure 
 A total of 48 3-year-olds were tested, 16 in each condition (23 boys, M=3;3; 
range 3;0-3;6).  All were native English speakers.  
The stimuli were identical to Exp. 1, but the procedure was slightly different.  
Three changes were made to ensure that the task was appropriate for this younger age 
group.  First, children were only told one fact about each of the test tools.  Second, all 
critical information was repeated three times.  Finally, children were given the chance to 
manipulate the test tools.  
At the beginning of each trial,  the experimenter labeled the standard tool.  Then 
she demonstrated and described its critical properties: manipulation in Exp. 2a, function 
in Exp. 2b and both in Exp 2c.  To ensure that our young participants caught all this, it Function Versus Motor 
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was repeated three times. Next the experimenter introduced and demonstrated the tests 
tools. In Exp. 2a, only motor information was presented.  In Exp. 2b, only functions were 
presented. In Exp. 2c, the experimenter demonstrated each test tool’s function and 
manipulation but labeled only the property that the tool shared with the standard.  In all 
three conditions, this information about the test tools was repeated while the child 
manipulated them. Finally, before the test question, the experimenter reminded the child 
about the name of the standard, its function and/or manipulation, and the labeled feature 
of each test tool.   
Analyses and Results 
To compare performance across conditions, we coded the responses as function 
matches or motor matches. In Exp. 2c this distinction is straightforward. In Exp. 2a, 
selection of the non-motor match was coded as a function match, because this is the item 
that would have been the function match in Exp. 2c.  Similarly, in Exp. 2b non-function 
matches were coded as motor matches.  This allows us to compare how changes in the 
information provided influence participants selection of a stable set of objects.  The 
proportion of function matches was analyzed as before (see Figure 3).   
In Exp. 2a, children were only given information about the movement used to 
employ the tool. They made reliable use of this cue, selecting the motor match for 69% of 
the trials, resulting in below chance selection of the function match (t(15)=2.96, p<0.01). 
In Exp. 2b, children reliably used the function information that was provided for 
categorization, selecting the function match on 64% of the trials (t(15)=2.80, p<0.01). 
Thus 3-year-olds clearly encode both function and motor information and can use both 
features in categorization. Function Versus Motor 
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___________________________________ 
Figure 3  
___________________________________ 
Exp. 2c pitted function against motor information.  Here we found that 3-year-
olds, like 5-year-olds and adults, showed a strong and reliable preference to categorize 
tools on the basis of shared function (71% of trials, t(15)=3.88, p<0.01).  There was a 
substantial shift from Exp. 2a to Exp. 2c, verifying that adding conflicting function 
information overrides categorization by motor movement (t(30)=4.79, p<.001). However, 
there was no reliable difference between Exp. 2b and Exp. 2c, suggesting that adding 
competing motor information has no effect on categorization by function (t(30)=1.02, 
p>.3).  
Discussion 
These results indicate that 3-year-olds categorize tools on the basis of shared 
function.  While this may suggest that the content of tool concepts is abstract, there is 
another, more perceptually based, interpretation. The children could be categorizing the 
tools according to the perceptual end-state brought about by their manipulation (i.e., the 
patterns in the playdough). These perceptual end-states were visible when the extension 
question was asked and may have guided responses. To explore this possibility, we tested 
5-year-olds in a paradigm in which the tool’s function was not perceptually accessible.  
These new functions were novel and imaginary (e.g., “to know what someone is 
thinking”) and no observable change happened when the tool was manipulated. If 
children can use such functions as the basis of categorization, we can conclude that Function Versus Motor 
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function cannot be reduced to perceptual end-state and tool concepts must be abstract by 
5 years of age.  
Experiment 3 
Participants, Stimuli and Procedure 
Fifteen native English speaking 5-year-olds (8 boys, M=5;1; range 4;3–5;8). The 
stimuli for consisted of six triplets of novel tools (plus two practice sets). The tools in 
each pair were similar in appearance but differed in their imaginary functions and motor 
movements (for a list of the invisible functions, see Table 2). The procedure was identical 
to Exp. 1. 
___________________________________ 
Table 2 
___________________________________ 
Results  
Again we calculated the proportion of function choices for each participant and 
submitted the scores to a one-sample t-test (Figure 2). Five-year-olds categorized based 
on function on 82% of trials (t(15)=4.74, p<0.001). Thirteen of the fifteen children 
selected more function than motor matches ( 
2(1)=8, p<.005).  
General Discussion 
These studies demonstrate that both young children and adults categorize novel 
tools based on their functions rather than the movements used to employ them  This 
pattern is in place quite early in development.  By three years of age function is so central 
to children’s tool concepts that their use of function is uninfluenced by the presentation of 
conflicting information about the tool’s motor manipulation (Exp. 2b and 2c). This notion Function Versus Motor 
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of function cannot be reduced to the perceptual end-state of the event -- by five years of 
age, children categorize by function even when the function is not visible (i.e., the 
function of ‘making a wish come true’ or ‘knowing what someone is thinking’ in Exp. 3). 
If we accept the common premise that conceptual content guides categorization, then 
these results indicate that motor information plays little or no part in the conceptual 
content of tool terms.  Instead these findings demonstrate that function plays a central 
role in the conceptual content of tool terms, or that function is closely associated with 
some other property which plays this role (e.g., creator’s intended function). Thus our 
findings run counter to the hypothesis suggested by the strong embodied view, namely, 
that motor information determines the conceptual content of tool terms.  
In the remainder of this discussion we attempt to integrate these findings with two 
distinct literatures:  1) developmental studies on children’s knowledge of tools and their 
extension of artifact labels and 2) studies in cognitive neuroscience on motoric activation 
during conceptual processing of tools. 
The development of tool concepts 
The conclusions of the present study may appear to be at odds with a growing 
literature suggesting the movement and motor experience affect children’s use and 
understanding of tools (Barrett et al., 2007; Mounoud et al., 2007; Sommerville, 
Hidebrand & Crane, 2008). We see no such conflict.  Clearly children have knowledge of 
the manipulative properties of tools from a young age: How else could they learn to use 
them (Barrett et al., 2007; Connolly and Dalgleish, 1989)?  But that does not mean that 
these motoric representations provide the conceptual content of tool terms. The only prior 
study which links children’s motoric representations to their knowledge of tool terms si Function Versus Motor 
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the Mounoud pantomime experiment (2007).  While the authors find that action 
pantomimes facilitate tool identification, they are quick to point out that this finding is 
compatible with a diverse set of mechanisms.  One of these possibilities is that the 
pantomimes are analyzed at a functional level resulting in direct priming of the tool 
concepts that are linked to these functions.  By demonstrating that functions are central to 
the conceptual content of tools (independent of motor patterns), our results provide 
further support to this analysis. 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of motoric tool concepts is one based on 
developmental priority.  As we noted in the introduction, Barrett and colleagues (2007) 
have suggested that infants initially learn about the manipulative properties of tools rather 
than their functions. This position is consistent with developmental theories which posit 
hat concept acquisition proceeds from the concrete to the abstract and raises the 
possibility that motor information continues to play a privileged role in establishing 
conceptual content.  However the bulk of the evidence does not support this view. First, 
as we noted in the introduction, the Barrett study does not directly test whether infants 
have encoded the function of the novel tool, instead it demonstrates that representations 
of tool manipulation extend across functions. Infants who practice inserting a tool while 
holding onto a loop, continue holding the loop in a rotation task, but that does not mean 
that they did not learn that the tool was initially used for insertion. In fact, more direct 
assessments have consistently found evidence that children encode functional 
information by about one year of age (Madole, Oakes & Cohen, 1993; Booth & Waxman, 
2002; Träuble & Pauen, 2007).  Träuble and Pauen’s study is particularly relevant 
because it rules out the possibility that what appears to be functional encoding is actually Function Versus Motor 
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motoric:  11-12 month old infants were presented with objects that could either be 
categorized in terms of global similarity or similarity of a particular functionally relevant 
part.  Categorization was assessed by manual habituation.  Children who saw a 
demonstration of the function of the part categorized on that basis, while uninitiated 
children favored global similarity.  Critically a control group of children who observed 
the objects being manipulated in the same way--but without producing the function--also 
categorized based on global similarity. 
Our findings demonstrate that functional information continues to play a central 
role in categorization in young children and adults.  These results are consistent with 
prior studies using the word extension task in young children.  In experiments in which 
perceptual similarity is equated, function guides the extension of novel artifact labels in 
children as young as two (Kemler Nelson et al., 2000ab).  However, these previous 
studies have one clear limitation:  function was manipulated without regard to the motor 
content of the action.  In the ordinary course of events, this would lead either to a 
systematic confound between function and motor movement (when the function is 
demonstrated) or to the absence of motoric information (when the function is merely 
described).  Thus the present study goes beyond the prior work by demonstrating that 
function continues to guide categorization even when it is pitted against motoric 
similarity.  
Curiously our findings suggest that motoric information may be less central to 
children’s tool concepts than shape is.  Differences in shape clearly interfere with 
children’s ability to extend artifact terms on the basis of their function.  In fact, when 
shape is pitted against function, young children sometimes prefer to categorize on the Function Versus Motor 
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basis of shape (see e.g., Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1998; Smith et al., 1996).  The 
interpretation of this data pattern is controversial: Some researchers see it as evidence of 
a shift from concrete to abstract (Smith et al., 1996) while others suggest that it reflects 
children’s knowledge that form usually reflects the intended function of an object 
(Kemler Nelson et al., 2000a). In contrast, we find no evidence that motor information 
competes with function during word extension.  Three year olds preference for functional 
extension was as strong in the presence of conflicting motoric cues as it was in their 
absence. 
How can we account for motor activations in tool tasks? 
The present studies were motivated by the robust observation that brain regions 
associated with movement and motor imagery are active during conceptual tool tasks.  
These findings raised the possibility that motoric representations provide the cognitive 
content of tool terms. Perhaps motor regions become active because they contain the 
representations which individuate and determine the extension of tool concepts.  The 
present findings are clearly rule out this possibility.  Both adults and young children 
systematically extend tool terms according the function of a tool rather than the way in 
which it is manipulated.  
So how do we account for the activation of motor regions during tool processing?  
Our findings are consistent with a wide range of possibilities. Three further 
considerations provide additional constraint. 
First, motor activations emerge across a wide range of tasks and stimuli including 
viewing pictures of tools, naming tool sounds, spontaneously generating tool names, and 
making lexical decisions for tool terms (Lewis, Brefczynski, Phinney, Janik  & DeYoe, Function Versus Motor 
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2005 Kiefer, 2005; Vitali et al., 2005).  Thus these activations cannot be attributed to a 
single response task or stimulus modality and are unlikely to reflect strategic behaviors 
(such as explicit motor imagery).  They appear to be an intrinsic part of the neural 
processes invoked when we think about tools. 
Second, evidence from both neuroimaging and patient studies demonstrates that 
the processing streams are involved in representation of motoric and functional 
knowledge are partially distinct.  For example, Canessa and colleagues found that when 
people compared tools according to their shared function, lateral anterior inferotemporal 
cortex was active. But when tools were compared according to shared motor 
manipulation greater activation was observed in motion-sensitive including left-IPS and 
dorsal premotor cortex (Canessa, Borgo, Cappa, Perani, Falini, Buccino, Tettamanti & 
Shallice, 2008). The same pattern emerges in patient studies:  lesions in dorsal stream 
regions which are implicated in tool processing are associated with apraxia, a deficit in  
motoric knowledge, while anterior infereotemporal lesions are associated with deficit in 
functional knowledge (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum et al., 2000; Sirigu et al., 
1991). 
Third, the pattern of deficits in apraxic patients suggest that activation of motor 
regions is not necessary for performing many of the conceptual tasks in which motor 
activations are typically observed. Apraxic patients can often name pictures of objects 
that they cannot use (see e.g., Ochipa et al., 1989) and sort these objects based on their 
functional properties (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002), suggesting that activation of motoric 
representations in not necessary lexical and conceptual processing of tool terms (Mahon 
& Caramazza, 2009).  However, this does not mean that motor representations are not Function Versus Motor 
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useful for tool identification.  Mahon and colleagues tested patients who had temporal 
and frontal lesions (Mahon et al., 2007). They found that deficits in object use were 
correlated with deficits in object identification, but only for patients who also had parietal 
lesions. They argue that in the context of damaged semantic system, motor information 
could facilitate object identification. 
Taken in concert, these findings suggest that activation of motor areas during tool 
processing reflect motoric representations that are strongly associated with particular 
tools but do not define them.   As Mahon and Caramazza (2008) note, many cognitive 
processes are characterized by the almost simultaneous activation of multiple levels of 
representation. For example, during word recognition the activation of word forms 
(phonological or orthographic) is immediately followed by the activation of word 
meanings.  This begins long before the word is uniquely identified.  After hearing just a 
few phonemes of a word, we begin accessing the semantic associates of words that begin 
with those phonemes (Yee & Sedivy, 2006).   As a consequence, semantic manipulations 
can influence performance on tasks which in principle could be carried out solely on the 
basis of the word’s phonological representation. For example, semantic priming speeds 
up both lexical decisions (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1976) and word naming (Frost, Katz & 
Bentin, 1987). But no one would argue that phonological or orthographic representations 
are composed of or grounded in semantic representations (or that the content of semantic 
representations is phonological). Instead most theorists posit that the strong association 
between meaning and phonological form leads the semantic representation to become 
active whenever the phonological representation is processed.  Similarly, we would argue 
that motor programs are not the content of tool concepts but instead are strongly Function Versus Motor 
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associated with these concepts.  Over time this strong association ensures that when we 
retrieve a tool concept the motor representation is quickly activated as well. 
Final Words 
Barsalou (2008) notes that the study of concepts has progressed along two 
divergent paths.  Cognitive science has used linguistic analysis, inductive inference and 
word extension to demonstrate the surprising abstraction of everyday concepts from early 
in development (see e.g., Carey, 2009; Gelman, 2003).  Meanwhile, cognitive 
neuroscience has produced equally convincing demonstrations that perceptual and motor 
systems are rapidly engaged during conceptual tasks.   The present study sought to bridge 
these paths by using the methods of developmental cognitive science to explore a 
theoretical proposal from cognitive neuroscience.    
Imagining studies suggest that motor areas are often active during conceptual tool 
tasks, raising the possibility that cognitive content of tool terms is motoric.  Our results  
demonstrate that this is false. Both adults and young children systematically categorize 
tools according to their function and not the movements used to employ them.  These 
results are consistent with prior studies demonstrating that function plays a critical role in 
children’s artifact concepts.  Our results also constrain the interpretation of the imaging 
studies. While motor areas are clearly active in tool tasks, the content of tool concepts is 
not motoric.  This does not rule out the possibility that motoric representations are 
facilatory or even necessary for performing many tool tasks; it simply suggest that we 
need to explore other hypotheses about the role that they play.  Function Versus Motor 
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Figure 1. Example of critical trial Experiment 1: the function and motor manipulation of 
the standard was counter-balanced between subjects.  
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Table 1. List of functions and motor manipulations for the critical trials of Experiment 1. 
Standard Tool 
F1M1 F 2M2 
Name  Test Tool 1  Test Tool 2 
A1: Roll to print 
butterflies  
A2: Stamp to cut 
circles in 
playdough  
Lat  Stamp to print 
butterflies 
Roll to cut circles 
in playdough  
B1: Push with two 
hands to make 
patterns in 
playdough 
B2: Swing to make 
a noise 
Zeft  Push with two 
hands to make a 
noise  
Swing to make 
patterns in 
playdough  
C1: Roll sideways 
to make squares in 
playdough 
C2: Tap to make 
playdough flat 
Tonk  Tap to make 
squares in 
playdough  
Roll sideways to 
make playdough 
flat 
D1: Press a button 
to make noise 
D2: Slam to cut a 
star 
Birt  Press a button to 
cut a star 
Slam to make a 
noise 
E1: Rock to make 
playdough flat 
E2: Press to cut 
triangles 
Fex  Press to make 
playdough flat 
Rock to cut 
triangles Function Versus Motor 
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Figure 2. Proportion of Tools Extended on the Basis of Shared Function for Adults and 5-
year-olds in Experiments 1 and 3. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Function Choices (or Non-Motor choices) for 3-year-olds in 
Experiment 2. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
C
h
o
i
c
e
s
Exp 2a: Motor Only Exp 2b: Function Only Exp 2c: Motor & Function
 Function Versus Motor 
 
35
 
Table 1.  Invisible functions and visible motor manipulations for Experiment 3. 
Standard Tool 
F1M1 F 2M2 
Name Test Tool 1  Test Tool 2 
A1: Roll to make it 
rain  
A2: Stamp to 
make rocks soft  
Lat  Stamp to make it 
rain  
Roll to make rocks 
soft  
B1: Push with two 
hands to heat up 
water 
B2: Swing to 
make a wish 
come true 
Zeft  Push with two hands 
to make a wish come 
true  
Swing to heat up 
water  
C1: Roll to make 
toys invisible 
C2: Tap to make 
plants grow 
Tonk  Tap to make toys 
invisible  
Roll to make plants 
grow  
D1: Wave in a 
circle to make 
people fall asleep 
D2: Swing to 
make a chicken 
lay an egg 
Dev  Wave in a circle to 
make a chicken lay 
an egg  
Swing to make 
people fall asleep  
E1: Rock to make 
juice salty 
E2: Press to 
make bread 
Fex  Press to make juice 
salty  
Rock to make bread 
F1: Hop to clean up 
a mess 
F2: Squeeze to 
find an answer to 
a riddle 
Vilk  Hop to answer a 
riddle  
Squeeze to clean up 
a mess  Function Versus Motor 
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